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N the immediate post-World-War II era, as international investment
gained momentum, foreign investors who sought the protection of
international investment law encountered an ephemeral structure
consisting largely of scattered treaty provisions, a few contested customs,
and some questionable general principles of law.' For investors, this in-
ternational legal structure was seriously deficient in at least four respects.
First, it was incomplete, for it failed to take account of contemporary in-
vestment practices and to address important issues of investor concern,
such as their rights to make monetary transfers from the host country.
Second, the principles that did exist were often vague and subject to vary-
ing interpretations. Third, the content of international investment law
was contested, particularly between industrialized countries and newly
decolonized developing nations that in the 1970s began to demand a new
international economic order to take account of their particular needs.2
Finally, existing international law offered foreign investors no effective
enforcement mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries that
had injured or seized their investments or refused to respect their con-
tractual obligations.
* Jeswald W. Salacuse (J.D., Harvard University; A.B., Hamilton College) is Henry
J. Braker Professor of Law at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University. This article is based on a paper that the author presented at a Confer-
ence on "International Investment Law at a Crossroads" at Harvard Law School
on March 3, 2006.
1. In 1970, the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case found it
surprising that the evolution of international investment law had not gone further
and that no generally accepted rules had yet crystallized in light of the growth of
foreign investments and the expansion of international activities by corporations in
the previous half-century. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd.
(BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46-47 (Feb. 5). Even as recently as 2004, one distin-
guished scholar, discussing the role of customary international law applicable to
international investments, found that "[t]here are few customs in this sense in the
field of foreign investment." M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 89 (2nd ed. 2004).
2. See JEFFREY HART, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-
SouTH DEBATE (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., MIT Press 1983). By 1990, the move-
ment for a New International Economic Order was basically dead. See Thomas
Waelde, A Requiem for the "New International Economic Order" The Rise and Fall
of Paradigms in International Economic Law, in FESTSCHRIFr FUER IGNAZ SEIDL-
HOHENVELDERN 771 (Gerhard Hafner et. al. eds., Kluwer 1998).
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As a result of these four deficiencies, investors had no assurance that
investment contracts and arrangements made with host country govern-
ments would not be subject to unilateral change by those governments at
some later time. Foreign investments, particularly in developing coun-
tries, were in the word of Raymond Vernon, "obsolescing bargain[s]" be-
tween the investor and the host country. 3 Years earlier, in his exploration
of the role of contract in the social order, Karl Llewellyn, a noted Ameri-
can legal scholar, had captured more graphically this same tension be-
tween negotiated agreements and subsequent reality when he likened it
to a Greek tragedy: "Life struggling against form. ' '4 In the post colonial
era of nationalizations and contract renegotiations, the political and eco-
nomic facts of life in host countries struggled against the form of various
legal commitments made to foreign investors. In that struggle, life usu-
ally triumphed over form.
II. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD TREATIFICATION
To change the dynamics of this struggle and protect the interests of
their companies and investors, industrialized countries began a process of
negotiating international investment treaties that, to the extent possible,
would be: 1) complete, 2) clear and specific, 3) uncontestable, and 4) en-
forceable. These treaty efforts took place at both the bilateral and multi-
lateral levels, which, though separate, tended to inform and reinforce
each other.
The bilateral efforts particularly bore fruit. Beginning in 1959, individ-
ual industrialized countries, negotiating on the basis of predetermined
models or prototypes, concluded bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with
specific developing countries in order to protect their investors in those
countries by: 1) subjecting host countries to a set of international legal
rules that they had to respect in dealing with investors and 2) by giving
investors themselves the right to bring a claim in international arbitration
against host country governments who violated those rules.5 The BITs'
intent was to restrain host country action against the interests of inves-
tors-in other words, to enable the form of legal commitments made to
investors to resist the forces of change often demanded by the political
and economic life in host countries. By 2006, the nations of the world
had concluded nearly 2,500 BITs6 affecting 170 countries and several
other important investment treaties containing similar provisions, such as
3. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF
U.S. ENTERPRISES 46 (Basic Books 1971).
4. "One turns from contemplation of the work of contract as from the experience of
Greek tragedy. Life struggling against form." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Con-
tract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 751 (1931).
5. For background on the BIT movement, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The
Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in
Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655 (1990).
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Develop-
ment, 26 (2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf.
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NAFTA7 and the Energy Charter Treaty 8. In addition, various other bi-
lateral international treaties, such as the Free Trade Agreements ad-
vanced by the United States 9 and the Economic Partnership Agreements
promoted by Japan, 10 contained chapters on investment that replicated
the provisions of the BITs. As a result of this process, a wide spread
treatification 1 of international investment law had taken place in a rela-
tively short time. An important support for this new architecture has
been the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID), which was formally established in 1965 as an affiliate of the World
Bank to resolve disputes between host countries and foreign private in-
vestors.12 Although ICSID did not hear its first case until 1972, it was
destined to become an important institution for international investment
dispute resolution. 13
Today, unlike the situation that prevailed in the immediate post-World
War era, foreign investors in many parts of the world are protected pri-
marily by international treaties, rather than by customary international
law alone. For all practical purposes, treaties have become the funda-
mental source of international law in the area of foreign investment. 14
This shift has been anything but theoretical. For one thing, it has imposed
a discipline on host country treatment of foreign investors. In cases
where host governments have failed to abide by their commitments to
investors, those governments have become respondents in international
arbitration proceedings (some 226 according to one recent count' 5), and
in many cases arbitral tribunals have held them liable to pay injured in-
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
8. European Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Feb. 1, 1995, 34 1.L.M. 360
(1995).
9. See generally Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade Agree-
ments, http://www.ustr.govfTrade-Agreements/SectionIndex.html
10. Masaki Yasushi, Economic Partnership Agreements and Japanese Strategy, 6
GAIKo FORUM 53 (2006).
11. The word treatification, while not recognized by any standard English dictionaries,
has been used on rare occasions previously. See, for example, the executive sum-
mary on missile proliferation on the web site of the Canadian Department of For-
eign External Affairs. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, www.
dfait-maeci.gc.ca/armslMTCR/page2-en.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
The origin of this derivation of the word treaty may perhaps be found in the
1908 Nobel lecture of the Peace Prize Laureate Frederik Bajer, who urged that a
treaty be established to govern the canals between the North and Baltic seas, stat-
ing "there is a need to 'treatify', if I may coin this expression, the waterways - the
French call them "canaux interoc6aniques" - which connect the two seas." See
Nobel Foundation, http://nobelprize.orglnobel-prizes/peace/laureates/1908/bajer-
lecture.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
12. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nation-
als of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
13. See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ con-
clude.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (listing concluded cases in chronological
order).
14. Patrick Juillard, L'Evolution des Sources du Droit des Investissements, 250
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACAD8MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 21, 74 (1994).
15. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 6, at 27.
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vestors substantial damage awards. 16 Today, increasingly in the interna-
tional investment domain, legal form seems to be winning out in its
struggle with life.
III. THE TREATIFICATION PUZZLE
Although the process of treatification of international investment law
seems to be continuing unabated, it also presents a puzzle: why do devel-
oping countries, who usually have few national investors in need of pro-
tection abroad, sign investment treaties whose effect is to restrain
governmental action in their dealings with foreign investors? Concluding
and sustaining a treaty, like any agreement, requires the existence of a
basic bargain between the parties, a bargain where both sides believe
they derive benefits. An investment treaty between two developed
states, both of whose nationals expect to invest in the territory of the
other, would be based on the notion of reciprocity and mutual protection.
One side promises to protect the investments of the other side's nationals
in return for protection of its own national's investments in the other
side's territory. But that basic bargain would not seem to apply in a BIT
between a developed, capital-exporting state and a poor developing
country whose nationals are unlikely to invest abroad. One may there-
fore ask why poor counties whose nationals have little prospect in the
near future, if ever, of undertaking foreign investments would sign a BIT
whose purpose is to protect the investments of foreigners. Why would it
be in that developing country's interest to constrain its sovereignty by
concluding a treaty whose very purpose is to limit the host government's
ability to take what it may judge in the future to be necessary legislative
and administrative action to advance and protect national interests?
One can identify five possible explanations to the BIT treatification
puzzle: 1) foreign investment promotion; 2) relationship building; 3) eco-
nomic liberalization; 4) encouragement of domestic investment; and 5)
improved governance and a strengthened rule of law. Let us examine
each one briefly.
A. INVESTMENT PROMOTION
The most common explanation to the BIT puzzle is that developing
countries sign BITs as a means to promote foreign investment and to
increase the amount of capital and associated technology flowing to their
territories. The basic assumption of this explanation is that a bilateral
investment treaty with clear and enforceable rules to protect and facili-
16. One notable example is the case of CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Re-
public, an UNCITRAL arbitration under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT,
which resulted in an award and payment of $355 million to an injured investor, one
of the largest awards ever made in an arbitration proceeding. Peter Green, Czech
Republic Pays $355 Million to Media Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003, at W1;
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (The Nether-
lands/Czech Republic BIT March 14, 2003), available at http://www.investment
claims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward-14Mar2OO3.pdf.
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tate foreign investment reduces risks that the investor would otherwise
face and that a reduction in risk, all other things being equal, encourages
investment.
In the 1980s and 1990s, as other forms of development finance became
less available from commercial banks and official aid institutions, devel-
oping countries increasingly turned to direct foreign investment in order
to foster economic development. 17 Developing countries have seen BITs
as one way of promoting investment and have therefore signed them in
increasing numbers. Thus, one can say that a BIT between a developed
and a developing country is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of
protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the
future.18
The dual objective of investment promotion and investment protection
is clearly evident in the full title of most BITs: A Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Protection of Investments.1 9
B. RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING
A second explanation to the BIT puzzle is that developing countries
sign bilateral investment treaties with developed countries in order to
strengthen their relationship with those countries so as to obtain other
benefits and favors, such as those in the domain of trade or foreign aid,
which such a strengthened relationship may yield. Thus, even though a
developing country may not be certain of increased investment flows
from its developed country treaty partner as a result of signing a BIT, it
has strong expectations that the BIT will result in closer ties with that
country that in turn will lead to increased trade, foreign aid, security as-
sistance, technology transfers, or other benefits that an improved rela-
tionship may yield. For example, when a left-of-center government came
to power in Uruguay in 2005 after a previous government had signed but
not yet ratified a BIT with the United States, the new government rene-
gotiated but ultimately ratified the BIT, justifying its action on the
grounds that it would protect and strengthen its important export mar-
kets in the United States.20
17. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67,
78 (2005).
18. Id.
19. E.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Indon.-UK,
Apr. 27, 1976, Treaty Series No. 62, available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/
Print %20Indonesia%206858.tif%20(7%20pages),0.pdf. U.S. BITs tend to refer to
this goal as "encouragement of investment" rather than the "promotion of invest-
ment." Based on an analysis of BIT provisions, it appears that the two terms,
encouragement and promotion, have the same meaning. See, e.g., Albania Bilat-
eral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995, TREATY Doc. No. 104-19, availa-
ble at www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2htOO6/22422.htm. See United States Bilateral
Investment Treaty Program, www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2htOO6/22422.htm (for the
texts of bilateral investment treaties to which the United States is a party).
20. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 76.
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C. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
A third explanation for the BIT movement is that developing countries
have signed BITs as part of their efforts to liberalize their economies and
thereby promote economic growth. Beginning in the late 1980s, many
developing countries that had previously built their economies on state
planning, state enterprises, heavy regulation of the private sector, and re-
stricted economic interactions with other countries began to abandon
those policies in favor of the neo-liberal economic model, known as the
Washington Consensus. 21 The Washington Consensus looks to markets
rather than state plans to allocate resources, to the private sector rather
than state corporations as the primary engines of economic activity, to
deregulation of their economies, and to openness to international eco-
nomic transactions, including direct foreign investment.2 2 Developing
countries have viewed BITs as one instrument among many others to
achieve a more liberal economy.
Some developed countries, the United States in particular, also saw
BITs as a means to facilitate liberalization of the economies of develop-
ing countries. Thus, they have sought to encourage or induce investment
and market liberalization within their negotiating partners. 23 In their
view, BITs will have the effect of liberalizing the developing country's
economy as a whole by facilitating the entry of a treaty partners' invest-
ments and creating conditions favoring their operations. As developing
countries have reformed their economies to foster private enterprise,
favorable conditions for foreign investment have been seen as very im-
portant part of that process. Although the goal of investment and market
liberalization is not specifically stated in the BITs themselves, that goal
has clearly been in the minds of developed country negotiators and is
sometimes reflected in background documents.2 4
21. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A
Changing Role for Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAW. 875, 883 (1999).
22. Id.
23. The Deputy U.S. Trade Representative stated U.S. goals in negotiating BITs as
follows:
The BIT program's basic aims are to: 1) protect U.S. investment abroad
in those countries where U.S. investors' rights are not protected through
existing agreements; 2) encourage adoption in foreign countries of mar-
ket-oriented domestic policies that treat private investment fairly; and 3)
support the development of international law standards consistent with
these objectives.
Jeffrey Lang, Keynote Address, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 457 (1998). See also
United States Trade Representative, USTR Focus on Investment, http://ustr.gov/
TradeSectors/Investment/SectionIndex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
24. For example, in the message from the President of the U.S. Transmitting the Treaty
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Republic of Albania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investment, with Annex and Protocol Signed at Washington on January 11,
1995, President Clinton stated: "The bilateral investment Treaty (BIT) with Alba-
nia will protect U.S. investment and assist the Republic of Albania in its efforts to
develop its economy by creating conditions more favorable for U.S. private invest-
ment and thus strengthen the development of its private sector." Investment
Treaty with Albania, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-19 (1990).
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D. DOMESTIC INVESTMENT ENCOURAGEMENT
Closely related to the objective of economic liberalization is the goal of
encouraging domestic entrepreneurs, who might be skeptical of their gov-
ernment's intentions toward private capital, to undertake productive in-
vestments. A BIT therefore serves as a signaling device to the domestic
private sector that the government's intentions toward private capital,
both foreign and domestic, are benign because of the international com-
mitment it has made in BITs to protect the capital of foreigners.
E. IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND A STRENGTHENED RULE OF LAW
Finally, a fifth explanation of the BIT puzzle is that developing coun-
tries have signed BITs to remedy the deficiencies in their own governance
institutions and in their own enforcement of the rule of law. BITs thus
become international substitutes for domestic institutions.25 The basis of
this explanation is that developing country authorities and institutions
that by virtue of a BIT have prevented themselves from acting in arbi-
trary and abusive fashion toward foreign investors will also be led to
avoid arbitrary and abusive actions toward their own nationals and that
over time those authorities and institutions will experience improved gov-
ernance and a heightened respect for the rule of law. Thus, as the Minis-
ter of Finance of Uruguay explained in a private conversation at the time
his country ratified its BIT with the United States, "We are not signing
this treaty for them [the United States], we are signing it for us."2 6
IV. SOLVING THE BIT PUZZLE
Given the diversity of their political and economic situations, individ-
ual developing countries among the 170 BIT signatories have no doubt
done so for one or more of the reasons advanced above. Some countries
have probably been more influenced by some goals than others. While
individual scholars have imputed one reason or another to explain devel-
oping countries' participation in the BIT movement, they have usually
done so without undertaking specific empirical research into the particu-
lar motives that drove individual developing countries to sign particular
BITs.
As important as their original reasons for entering into BITs is whether
or not developing countries have in fact achieved the goals they were
seeking. Evidence demonstrating that investment treaties have in fact
achieved any or all of the above five goals is not overwhelmingly convinc-
ing and has been the subject of much debate. Various studies have con-
cluded that BITs with some developed countries but not others do result
See also United States Trade Representative, USTR Focus on Investment, supra
note 23.
25. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 107, 107-23 (2005).
26. Reported to the author in a private conversation.
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in increased capital flows, 27 that BITs as a whole do not result in in-
creased investment flows, 28 that they have had only a very limited impact
on economic liberalization,29 and that they may actually have led to re-
ductions in governance quality. 30
Opponents of the BITs have not only argued that developing countries
have not attained the benefits they sought, they also contend that the
costs to developing countries have been too high. Those costs lie prima-
rily in the restrictions on actions that governments often feel a need to
take to protect and strengthen their countries' environmental, labor, and
other standards necessary to improve the lives of their populations.
Those governments that have taken such actions affecting investor inter-
ests have found themselves involved in expensive investor-state arbitra-
tions in growing numbers.
Despite its increasing prevalence, the uniqueness and power of inves-
tor-state arbitration should not be overlooked. For one thing, investor-
state arbitrations are not simple commercial disputes that affect only the
parties immediately involved. Since most investor-state arbitrations are
judging the legality of governmental actions, they have significant public
policy consequences relating to the ability of sovereign governments to
regulate enterprises within their territories. 31 Moreover, there are few
instances in international law where a private party may compel a sover-
eign state to defend the legality of that state's actions in an international
forum and, if it fails to defend itself successfully, pay substantial damages
for the injury caused to the private party by such action.
Determining whether developing countries have actually attained at a
reasonable cost the goals they sought in signing BITs is not a purely aca-
demic matter. For any treaty system to be sustainable over the long term,
the parties to it must remain convinced that they are achieving the bene-
fits they originally sought and that those benefits outweigh their costs.
Based on their interpretation of available evidence, critics of the BIT
movement have questioned the wisdom of the treatification process of
international investment law and have argued that it needs to be slowed,
27. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 111.
28. E.g., Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign
Direct Investment? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite (World Bank, Working
Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143-wps
3121.pdf. But see Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 111 (concluding with re-
gard to U.S. BITs that there is a strong correlation between ratifying a BIT and
increased capital flows to the developing country concerned).
29. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development:
The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 504
(1998).
30. Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 122.
31. Because of these public policy consequences, one scholar has characterized inves-
tor-state arbitration as a method of "transnational governance." Gus Van Harten,
Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the International
System of Investor State Protection, 12 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 600, 607 (2005).
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if not reversed. 32 If host countries come to believe that they have not
obtained the intended benefits, they may seek to weaken the treaties'
ability to resist the demands of the life or to abandon them all together.
BITs themselves may become obsolescing bargains.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES OF
TREATIFICATION: INVESTMENT REGIME
CREATION AND ITS FUTURE
The nature and sources of international investment law have under-
gone a significant transformation in a relatively short time. The creation
of an increasingly dense network of international investment treaties
therefore represents an important milestone in the evolution of interna-
tional economic law.
One important consequence of treatification is that it has increased the
importance of international investment law in the economic relations
among states to levels that it never enjoyed before. Prior to treatifica-
tion, international investment law was basically an arcane subject that in-
terested only a few academic international lawyers. It had little practical
effect. Today, it has become of immense practical concern to a much
wider audience, including the practicing bar, environmentalists, nongov-
ernmental organizations, multinational companies, and governments,
both industrialized and developing, who sometimes question the conse-
quences of what they have created over the last four decades. As a result,
unlike the situation that prevailed thirty years ago, government officials,
international executives, lawyers, and financiers increasingly must take
investment treaties into account in planning, negotiating, undertaking,
and managing international investment transactions.
Perhaps of greater importance from the perspective of international re-
lations, the process of treatification of international investment law has
also resulted in the creation of an emerging global regime for interna-
tional investment. An international regime has been defined as "princi-
ples, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations. '33 Inter-
national "[r]egimes constrain and regularize the behavior participants, af-
fect which issues among protagonists move on and off the agendas,
determine which activities are legitimized or condemned, and influence
32. The International Institute for Sustainable Development has been particularly ac-
tive in studying the impact of investment treaties on environmental and develop-
ment problems. See, e.g., Konrad von Moltke, A Model International Investment
Agreement for the Promotion of Sustainable Development, INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2004), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/
trade-model-inv.pdf.
33. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as In-
tervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983).
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whether, when, and how conflicts are resolved. '34 Taken together, the
network of international investment treaties do all of these things.
Nations create international regimes in order to deal with problems in
a manner that advances their interests. Since World War II, while the
nations of the world have been building a global investment regime, they
have also been hard at work in developing an international trade regime,
primarily through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and since
1995 the World Trade Organization. Whereas the international trade re-
gime has been developed on a multilateral basis through a succession of
multilateral negotiating rounds, the investment regime has been built on
a bilateral basis as numerous pairs of countries have negotiated similar
rules and enforcement mechanisms that apply to their nationals in each
others' territory. An interesting theoretical question that is beyond the
scope of this article is why the nations of the world chose a multilateral
negotiating approach to trade but a bilateral approach to international
investment with respect to regime creation and what the differing conse-
quences of the two approaches are for the effectiveness and durability of
the two regimes.
The treatification of international investment law represents an impor-
tant stage in the development of international investment law. Having
passed one crossroads on a journey, the evolution of international invest-
ment faces other challenges on the road ahead. At this point, one can
identify at least five:
1. For the reasons discussed above, international investment treaties
have come under increasing criticism from developing country gov-
ernments, the international environmental community, and other
elements of civil society. In the face of that criticism of treatifica-
tion's constraints on national sovereignty, what steps can be taken
to sustain and strengthen the bargain that under-girds the interna-
tional investment treaty system?
2. Developing country governments have been subject in increasing
numbers to investor-state arbitrations. In view of the costs of that
process and the perceived limitations it places on national sover-
eignty, to what extent will host countries continue to accept the
prevailing system of investor-state arbitration as a way of resolving
the conflicts between life and form and what measures need to be
adopted to preserve continued acceptance?
3. Since the beginning of the BIT movement, scholars have debated
the extent that BITs constitute customary international law with
respect to foreign investment. One argument is that BITs "estab-
lish and accept and thus enlarge the force of traditional concep-
34. Donald J. Puchala & Raymond F. Hopkins, International Regimes: Lessons for
Inductive Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 61, 62 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983).
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tions" of the law of state responsibility for foreign investment.35
Others have countered that, despite their prevalence, BITs are lex
specialis, and have effect only between he parties to the BIT.36 Ac-
cording to this view, BIT provisions are not sufficiently uniform to
establish customs accepted by the international community. Two
recent arbitration awards have taken the view that BITs do indeed
constitute or at least contribute to international customs. 37 A ques-
tion for the future evolution of international investment law there-
fore is to what extent have the principles and concepts of
international investment treaties, because of their number, come to
constitute international custom? If they have, the process of creat-
ing an international law of investment has seemingly evolved from
a situation where the absence of appropriate custom prompted the
creation of over 2,400 BITs, which in turn has led to the creation of
custom.
4. The notion that the principles embodied in BITs could represent
general principles of law38 and thus constitute a source of interna-
tional law has not received extensive consideration by scholars.
But as BITs proliferate, more and more countries incorporate BITs
into their domestic legal systems. Thus, there is scope for arguing
that BITs manifest certain concepts on the treatment of investors
and investments that represent general principles of law. The argu-
ment is strengthened to the extent that individual countries have
adopted foreign investment codes and laws that embody and am-
plify the rights accorded to investors in the BITs that host countries
have signed.39 To what extent have investment treaty principles, by
virtue of being incorporated into domestic legal systems, come to
constitute general principles of law and thereby a source of interna-
tional law?
5. The dramatic struggle of life against form that Karl Llewellyn saw
as fundamental to the role of contract in the social order is played
out in the foreign investment context as a struggle between the
property rights of the investor and the right of the host government
to regulate enterprises operating on its territory. The boundary be-
tween property rights and the right to regulate is not clear and will
almost certainly be the subject of negotiations and arbitral pro-
ceedings in the years ahead. Thus the fifth and final challenge for
35. F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 249 (1981).
36. See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formula-
tion of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994).
See also SORNARAJAH, supra note 1, at 276.
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international investment law is to find ways to resolve the continu-
ing conflict between the legal form imposed by investment treaties
and host government's legitimate right to regulate in response to
the demands of life.4
0
40. After considerable struggle, the members of the World Trade Organization meet-
ing at Doha in November 2001 agreed to include the subject of foreign investment
on the agenda of its next round of trade talks, known commonly as the Doha
Round. With respect to investment, the work plan for the round approved at the
Ministerial meeting in November 2001 recognizes "the case for a multilateral
framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term
cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will contribute
to the expansion of trade." The general mandate for the negotiators, emphasizing
other goals, is as follows: "Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the
interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development
policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to regulate in the
public interest." World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Novem-
ber 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 20, 22 (2002).
